Strategic stability concept in its classical format inherently linked to nuclear deterrence was developed in times of global confrontation between the United States and former Soviet Union having its main purpose in preventing a large-scale nuclear conflict between the two antagonists (Cold war residual containing type of strategic stability).
According to my observation and research, China’s military modernization including nuclear force development fastened its speed since 1999 or so. There are major four factors which made Chinese leaders began to rethink the international situation and its national security environment. Firstly, frequent military interventions and regional wars in the post-Cold War years, though with various backgrounds, strengthened the role and position of the military in international relations.
The United States currently owns the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, with more than 5,000 operational nuclear weapons. Most of these weapons are located inside U .S. territory – in missile silos, on bombers, and inside storage facilities. Others sit on U.S. nuclear submarines, traversing the ocean. Sometimes forgotten, however, are the nuclear weapons that the United States stores on foreign soil. Today, more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, five countries – Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey – host about 200 U.S. nuclear warheads.
There are many evidences that India and Pakistan see the principle of minimum nuclear deterrence as a basis for their nuclear doctrines.
Following usual rhetoric, the end of the Cold War replaced the global competition for supremacy of the two great powers and fears of a large-scale nuclear conflict between them with a new era of cooperation and consolidating efforts for enhancing international security.
“The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased...These changes in the nuclear threat environment – especially the heightened concern about nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation and the less dangerous strategic interaction between the United States and Russia – have not emerged overnight. They have developed over the last twenty years, and Administrations of both parties have responded with modifications of U.S.
The year 2011 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan. In retrospect of China-Pakistan relations in the past sixty years, it’s not difficult to conclude that security relation is the most important aspect in the bilateral relations. Generally speaking, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is an unavoidable subject when it comes to talk about the security relations between them.
Jarrod Hayes’ in his conceptual piece “Nuclear Disarmament and Stability in the Logic of Habit” draws upon the paper “The Logic of Habit in International Relations” by Ted Hopf, who in turn focuses on one of the four ‘orientations’ of social action distinguished by Max Weber. Hopf, following Weber, emphasizes that the logic of habit “precludes rationality, agency, and uncertainty” [Hopf]. Habits are the way to deal with limited intellectual capacity and they always reinforce the status quo.
This memo is based on an on-going study that explores the phenomenon of nuclear knowledge diffusion at conceptual level. Based on conceptual understanding it traces diffusion of nuclear knowledge in Pakistan with a focus on three main areas; technology, policy and posture.
