Missile Defense Cooperation: It’s Really Not That Hard
By BG Kevin Ryan (US Army retired)
Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
According to American press reports, the United States and Russia were close to signing an agreement on missile defense cooperation on the margins of the G8 Summit in May of this year. The details of the proposal are not public, but the disappointment over not achieving the agreement is.
On the surface (and indeed well below), the disagreement between the US and Russia over US missile defense plans seems intractable and destined to scuttle further arms and security agreements. In worst-case scenarios it is feared that it would drop the “bilateral temperature” enough to start a new Cold War. It is true that not since the failure at the Reykjavik Summit 25 years ago to stem deployment of offensive nuclear missiles in Europe have Russia and the US faced off on such a serious arms issue.
But let’s get a grip. It’s not 1986 and the US and Russia are not squared off in a nuclear stalemate. We’re discussing defensive missiles – not offensive ones. And we’re discussing cooperation – not confrontation. At least we could be.
I am not privy to the details of the recently aborted agreement, but my 30-plus years of experience as an air and missile defense officer dealing with Russian and American bureaucracies leads me to believe that we weren’t really that close. There’s so much confusion over terms like “joint” and “sectors” and misunderstanding of actual system capabilities that we talk past each other as if we were negotiating without interpreters.
Although it’s not 1986, we should take a page from our predecessors’ playbook. A year after the failure at Reykjavik to resolve the nuclear stand-off in Europe, both sides achieved a stunning and historic agreement to eliminate an entire class of offensive missiles. All we need is a clear understanding of what the problem is and some common-sense thinking.
Here are two clues to understanding the problem:
1. Today, to prevent a nuclear missile attack, the United States and Russia are pursuing two fundamentally opposing strategies: one a missile defense system, and the other the capability to defeat a missile defense system. The US and Russia are aiming for the same goal—freedom from a nuclear missile attack—but the strategies are antithetical. The reasons behind the two different strategies are that Russia knows it cannot afford a robust missile defense system, but the United States believes it can.
2. The United States does not need Russian cooperation to deploy missile defense; it is already doing so. The US, however, does need Russian cooperation to prevent a missile attack against America. That is because, for the foreseeable future, Russia will retain the capacity to attack the American homeland with nuclear missiles despite our missile defense deployments. So, US leaders must address Russian concerns or risk actually increasing the threat of nuclear attack by the very deployment we hoped would reduce that threat.
Aegis SM3 launch (Photo courtesy of US Missile Defense Agency)
Both sides have painted themselves into corners with ultimatums and proposals that have been quickly dismissed by the other. President Obama and NATO Secretary Rasmussen have both offered to cooperate with Russia but have rejected “joint” or “combined” systems. President Medvedev has called for a “unified” system but has demanded guarantees about deployment and targeting.
Couple these political caveats with an almost ubiquitous ignorance of what current and projected missile defenses can actually do, and it’s a wonder that we can even schedule a meeting in which to disagree. But, in a sign that we are living in a different world than we were 25 years ago, we are actually meeting and talking. What we need now are ideas that reflect our improved relationship.
Putting aside the statements and preconditions leaders have voiced, here are three concrete things the U.S.and Russia could do to break the impasse over missile defense cooperation:
- Jointly Develop Separate Systems. The reality today is that our two systems cannot be easily combined. The technologies are complicated and different and don’t talk to one another. But, who in the 1960’s would have predicted that the competing US and Russian space programs would be working together by the 1970’s? Or that by 2011, the US would rely entirely on Russia to send its astronauts into space? Maybe we should let NASA and the Russian Space Agency work this out. We need a missile defense architecture that recognizes the current capabilities and limitations of the two sides but sets us on a path to closer integration tomorrow. To begin with, the US, NATO and Russia should agree to include Russian missile defense systems into the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile command and control system. Both Russia and the US must make their technologies more open to each other so that communication and coordination can be achieved between the two systems. This is a job that industry can lead with government permission.
- Steps by the United States. It’s time for America to realize that it is not 1986 (nor 1996 nor 2006) and Russia is not the adversary it once was. I am a proponent of missile defense, but I have enough experience with it to know that it will always remain a limited system, capable of protecting our forces, neighbors, and homeland only partially. Let’s promise Russia in writing what we already know is reality – our system will remain limited and will not be directed against Russia.
- Steps by Russia. It’s also time for Russia to realize that the US is not its enemy and to admit that NATO is not a threat. Every new radar site or missile defense launcher is not an existential danger to Russia. Russia should agree to share its major military advantage – its geography. US/NATO radars in Russia’s southern tier would be ideal for defense against missiles from Iran. And, for US engagements by the Aegis SM3 missiles, Russia should grant permission to intercept enemy ballistic missiles over or near Russian territory.
There are many other steps we can take such as a serious and open joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat, joint research and development agreements, and joint training. Perhaps we could even expand on our 1987 success in eliminating our own intermediate range ballistic missiles by encouraging the rest of the world to follow suit. None of these cooperative efforts is out of our reach. Let’s emulate 1987 and not 1986.
Kevin Ryan also wrote about this issue in greater depth in a recent article called “Preventing the Unithinkable” in the Journal of International Security Affairs. For related research on U.S.-Russia security relations, visit the Belfer Center’s U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism.