Imaginary Nuclear Conflicts: Explaining Deterrence Policy Preference Formation

Volume 22, Issue 4, 2013

 

Abstract:

Although the question of how policymakers arrive at their nuclear doctrine and force structure preferences is one of unparalleled importance, it has not received systematic attention in international relations. This article, therefore, develops and illustrates a behavioral model of nuclear deterrence preference formation wherein variation in such preferences is a function of the content and flexibility of one's theory-driven thinking. A policymaker determines the value of potential doctrine and force structure positions in the context of his or her beliefs about the nature of how nuclear conflict will likely begin and proceed—i.e., whether more as a result of rational and deliberate action or due to fear, misperception, and accident. This analysis challenges the dominant explanations of doctrine and force structure preference formation that are implicit in ir. It suggests how the dialogue of the deaf in domestic debates over nuclear weapons policy can be reduced in the future and provides new criteria by which to recast the proliferation optimist-pessimist debate.