The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice

This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.

2012 Winner Announced - The editors of the Journal of Strategic Studies are pleased to announce that Dmitry Dima Adamsky, Associate Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya, is the winner of the 2012 annual Amos Perlmutter Prize.   The prize, founded seven years ago and named in memory of the founding editor of the journal, recognizes the best essay submitted for publication to the Journal of Strategic Studies by a junior faculty member.

Adamsky’s article titled, ‘The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’ distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War.