Official Statement

Gottemoeller: Nuclear Policy and Negotiations in the 21st Century

pbaxter7 — Sat, 08 Nov 2014 12:29:17 +0000

Gottemoeller: Nuclear Policy and Negotiations in the 21st Century

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Official Statement

pbaxter7 Sat, 11/08/2014 - 07:29

Arms Control and International Security: Nuclear Policy and Negotiations in the 21st Century

11/07/2014 01:23 PM EST

Nuclear Policy and Negotiations in the 21st Century

Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
The Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership & Public Policy, University of New Hampshire School of Law
Concord, New Hampshire
November 6, 2014

Good Afternoon. Thank you, John, for the kind introduction. Thank you very much for inviting me to join you at here at the Rudman Center. I was last here in May of 2013 to talk about export control reform with Senator Jeanne Shaheen. I am glad to be back to talk about arms control and nonproliferation negotiations in the 21st century.

While we are gathered here tonight in Concord, the world is facing serious challenges: the threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s flagrant disregard for international law, the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, a dangerous Ebola outbreak in West Africa that has travelled to our shores. It is not surprising that most people are not focused on nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence.

When the Cold War ended, the looming threat of nuclear war seemed to drift away for the average American. When was the last time you even heard of someone doing a duck-and-cover drill or building a bomb shelter in their backyard? Unfortunately, there are still thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. The threat from these weapons is real and I would argue that it has become more serious due to the threat from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.

That is why this Administration, like the Administrations before it, is working so hard to reduce the nuclear threat. One of the steps in that process was the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) – a Treaty for which I led the U.S. negotiating team.

In negotiating New START, we knew that it was necessary to replace the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement reflecting progress in arms control and the changes in the world in the 20 years since START came into force.

This was no small task and it took many, many months to complete, but we were successful and in December of 2010, the Senate gave its advice and consent to its ratification. The implementation of this Treaty is now well underway and when it is completed, we will have the lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear arms since the 1950’s.

As we now look to the future of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and treaties, it is important to recognize that we will need a host of new technical and legal experts to conduct these discussions. It is true that diplomacy is an art, not a science, but there are a number of reliable tools upon which I rely during negotiations.

One: Building Relationships

First, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of building good, professional relationships. With the New START Treaty, the two delegations launched into the negotiations committed to conducting them in an atmosphere of mutual respect with a premium on keeping the tone businesslike and productive, even when we did not agree. My counterpart on the Russian delegation, Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, always used to say, “business is business.” And what he meant was that we needed to keep the tone of the discussion businesslike even when we were butting heads – as we frequently did.

We also were very aware of the role of a human gesture. Even things as simple as acknowledging national holidays, cultural and sport events are important. The Vancouver Olympics were going on while were in Geneva for New START, and we cheered on each other’s teams. Well, maybe not each other’s hockey teams.

Also, never underestimate the power of a smile or a joke. You would be very surprised about how much a well-placed joke can help move talks along.

Two: Establishing Trust

Second, building relationships is one thing, but establishing trust is another, and it takes longer. Between negotiating teams, it is pivotal and more difficult than it sounds. In our case, we had over a year to get to know our counterparts. Further, members of both delegations brought valuable experience to the table, having worked as inspectors under START. They had inspected each other’s ICBM bases, SLBM bases, heavy bomber bases, and storage facilities multiple times. They regarded each other as professionals. That helped to establish trust.

One of the most important very important things is that our delegations agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

Trying to work out issues and disagreements through the press is – as you can imagine – is not a great model for success.

So make sure the people you are working with know that they can trust you. Trust is the foundation of any good agreement.

Three: Creating Value for Both Sides

Third, and particularly important right now, is the fact that negotiations should not be a zero-sum game. The point is to negotiate for mutual benefit. When we finished negotiating New START, then-President Medvedev referred to it as a “win-win” situation. That should always be our goal.

This is especially important for multilateral discussions, but harder to accomplish. No one will ever get everything they want – the point is to come away with a fair deal all-around. You may not get a “win-win” situation all the time, but you can avoid a situation where parties come away from a negotiation feeling that they have lost.

Four: LISTENING

It may seem simple, but another key to negotiating is listening.

During New START, it really helped that we spoke each other’s languages. I am very proud to say that there were probably as many Russian speakers on the U.S. delegation as there were English speakers on the Russian delegation. For me, hearing things twice helped me to listen to things extra well.

It is also something you probably heard from your mothers, but you also need to make sure you are really listening to people and not just waiting for your turn to talk. You might miss something important!

Five: Negotiating Process AND Substance

In addition to negotiating skills, you also need expertise on the substance. One of the things that made the New START negotiations work smoothly was the fact that we had experienced diplomats and experienced inspectors, as well as weapon systems operators. All of them had to work together.

You can negotiate beautiful language, but if you don’t understand the ins and outs of an inspection on the ground, imprecise language in the treaty can come back to haunt you. But you also need room for flexibility. You may think you understand exactly how to inspect a re-entry vehicle on a missile, but you need to tread lightly when codifying the requirement to conduct such an inspection in a treaty. An inspector also needs room to use his or her judgment.

You always have to think about both the big picture and the little details: it’s a balancing act.

Six: Be Thorough and Be Prepared

Finally, it is important to remember that every negotiation is different. While the START negotiations from over 20 years ago informed our approach, we were in a completely new era with New START. We had to think about what worked and didn’t work for previous treaties, without letting that bind our creativity.

One of the great strengths of the New START Treaty rested on the fact that we took into account the broad perspectives of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the uniformed military, the Department of Energy, and other agencies, from the very beginning and at every step throughout the negotiations. It was a true inter-agency effort from day one until the day it entered into force and that cooperation continues, as we work to implement the Treaty.

Dealing with Difficulties

Even with the tools that I have discussed in hand, there were some days during the New START negotiations that were very rough and very long. Beyond that, I like to joke that I went through two sets of negotiations- one with the Russian Federation and one with the Senate. We had a tough, vigorous debate up on Capitol Hill, but in the process, I think we rekindled some important interest in arms control and nonproliferation issues.

In the end, the hard work paid off. New START is enhancing our national security, as well as strategic stability with Russia. The current tensions with Russia highlight the importance of mutual confidence provided by data exchanges and on-site inspections under the Treaty, and the security and predictability provided by verifiable, mutual limits on strategic weapons.

As we look to the future with respect to future nuclear reduction agreements, the United States will only pursue agreements that are in our national security interest and that of our allies. Historically, the United States and Russia have always been able to continue our work to reduce nuclear threats. That fact should not change.

The United States has made clear that we are prepared to engage Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability and that there are real and meaningful steps we should be taking that can contribute to a more predictable and safer security environment.

In June 2013 in Berlin, President Obama stated U.S. willingness to negotiate a reduction of up to one-third of our deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty.

Progress requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment.

As I have said, no one here should doubt that we are in a difficult crisis period with Russia, but we need nuclear cooperation with Russia and others to address global threats – first and foremost the threat of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon or nuclear material.

The reason we can and must continue to pursue arms control and nonproliferation tools is that they are the best - and quite frankly - the only path that we can take to effectively prevent a terrorist nuclear threat and reduce nuclear dangers more broadly.

That will take new, and I am sure, difficult negotiations.

Final Thoughts

With that I would like to wrap up and take some questions, but I want to leave you with some final thoughts. With all the challenges in the world, it is sometimes easy to despair, but I assure you that through hard work, humor, patience and persistence, we can meet and solve these challenges.

One of our less-quoted presidents, Calvin Coolidge had a quote about persistence that I often think of:

“Nothing in the world can take the place of Persistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are omnipotent. The slogan 'Press On' has solved and always will solve the problems of the human race.”

That is what I think about when I think about the next set of negotiations in front of me. Whether that involves the next steps in nuclear reductions or banning the production of the fissile material used in nuclear weapons, we will be patient, but we will be persistent. Progress will not only require building on the success of New START, but new and innovative approaches to the challenges we face…and some really good negotiating. Thank you.

http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/233844.htm

Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges: Verification and Entry Into Force of the CTBT

pbaxter7 — Thu, 18 Sep 2014 18:40:43 +0000

Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges: Verification and Entry Into Force of the CTBT

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Official Statement

pbaxter7 Thu, 09/18/2014 - 14:40

Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges: Verification and Entry Into Force of the CTBT

Remarks

Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Washington, DC

September 15, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Daryl. Thank you also to my esteemed colleague, General Klotz. I think this might be the first time we have been on a panel together in our current positions, but I hope it won’t be the last. On this subject in particular, it is great to have the opportunity for us to communicate why the entire Administration sees this Treaty as effective, verifiable and absolutely beneficial to our national security.

Thank you also to the Embassy of Kazakhstan, Deputy Chief of Mission Yerkin Akhinzhanov, the Embassy of Canada, the Arms Control Association, Global Green and partners for hosting us here at USIP. Finally, thank you to my former boss, Secretary Moniz for his remarks earlier.

Secretary Kerry was actually right here just a year ago, speaking about nuclear security and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He quoted a line from President Kennedy’s American University speech that talked about a total ban on nuclear explosive test being “so near and yet so far.” We remain somewhat in this place today, fifty years later – “so near and yet so far.” We know the goal remains worthy and we know that it is still the right one for American national security. The difference today is that we know we have the tools to make it a reality.

General Klotz has just covered some stockpile and verification issues, so I would like to focus on the national security benefits of the Treaty and the process of moving the United States towards entry into force. I will also give you a little readout on how I’ve used my time this year to advance the case for the Treaty.

First and foremost, it is clear that CTBT is a key part of leading nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.

An in-force CTBT will hinder states that do not have nuclear weapons from developing advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.

States interested in pursuing or advancing a nuclear weapons program would have to either risk deploying weapons without the confidence that they would work properly, or accept the international condemnation and reprisals that would follow a nuclear explosive test.

An in-force Treaty would also impede states with more established nuclear weapon capabilities from confirming the performance of advanced nuclear weapon designs that they have not tested successfully in the past.

Because of this, an in-force CTBT will also constrain regional arms races. These constraints will be particularly important in Asia, where states are building up and modernizing nuclear forces.

For our part, ratification will help enhance our leadership role in nonproliferation and strengthen our hand in pursuing tough actions against suspected proliferators. That is more important than ever, in our current global environment. Nuclear security is a preeminent goal for President Obama and this Administration.

All told, it is in our interest to close the door on nuclear explosive testing forever.

As many of you know, I was invited to speak in the Marshall Islands on the 60th anniversary of the Castle Bravo nuclear test. It was quite an honor and while there, I was able to meet with government and community leaders, as well as displaced communities. I told them that it is the United States’ deep understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons – including the devastating health effects– that has guided and motivated our efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate these most hazardous of weapons.

About a month after visiting the Marshall Islands, I travelled to Hiroshima. Upon arriving, I visited the Cenotaph and the Peace Museum and spoke with an atomic survivor. The day was a somber, but critically important reminder that all nations should avoid the horrors of nuclear war.

We have made great strides over the past forty years, achieving an 85 percent reduction in the U.S. nuclear stockpile since 1967 and creating agreements such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, START, New START and more. But, we still have far to go.

It was President Ronald Reagan who, speaking before the Japanese Diet, pronounced clearly and with conviction that “there can be only one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age. A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.”

Those words had great resonance for the students that I spoke with at Hiroshima University last April. My conversation with them focused on the CTBT and how it could contribute to reducing global nuclear threats.

Bright, engaged and motivated, the students were eager to know what they could do to help in the push towards entry into force. I told them, as I tell all the students I meet, that the most important thing that supporters of the Treaty can do is to educate their friends, their family and their communities.

That is something that I will be continuing to do throughout the year, with trips to various U.S. states to speak with students, faith and community groups, as well as expert audiences. In fact, I will be at Stanford on Wednesday to do just that.

Now, I will pivot to the question that is asked each and every time this Treaty is discussed: “What is the plan for Senate ratification?”

The answer is simple. First comes education, and then comes discussion and last and most importantly, comes debate. It is only through that process that you get to a place where a vote could happen.

We are reintroducing this Treaty to the American public, since it has been quite some time it has been discussed outside the Capital Beltway. We are and will continue to outline the clear and convincing facts about our ability to maintain the nuclear stockpile without explosive testing and our ability to effectively monitor and verify Treaty compliance. Both Secretary Moniz and General Klotz have spoken about these two issues this afternoon and they are strong allies in this effort.

We are and will continue to make it clear that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing will hinder regional arms races and impede advancements in nuclear stockpiles around the world.

With an emphasis on a healthy, open dialogue, rather than a timeline, we are working with the Senate to re-familiarize Members with the Treaty. A lot of CTBT-related issues have changed since 1999, but the Senate has changed a lot since then, too. It is up to us, as policymakers and experts before the American people, to practice due diligence in consideration of this Treaty – that means briefings, hearings at the appropriate time, more briefings, trips to Labs, trips to Vienna and the CTBTO, more briefings, etc., etc.. The Senators should have every opportunity to ask questions, many questions, until they are satisfied.

I want to make one thing very clear: this Administration has no intention of rushing this or demanding premature action before we have had a thorough and rigorous discussion and debate.

I know that it is the official sport of Washington, but I would ask people to refrain from counting votes right now. Our first priority is education and our focus should be on the hard work that goes into any Senate consideration of a Treaty. The New START process can serve as our touchstone. I realize that is less fun than reading tea leaves. I realize that it’s unglamorous and deliberate, but that is how good policy is made and that is how treaties get across the finish line.

Of course, as we have said many times, there is no reason for the remaining Annex 2 states to wait for the United States before completing their own ratification processes. We have been pleased to hear some positive statements coming from Annex 2 states in recent months, and we hope that positive vibe turns into action. I would also like to congratulate Congo, which very recently ratified the CTBT.

Finally, we urge States to provide adequate financial and political support for the completion of the CTBT verification regime and its provisional operations between now and the entry into force of the treaty. The CTBTO, now under the able guidance of Dr. Zerbo, has and will continue to do a fantastic job of readying the Treaty’s verification regime for eventual entry into force. For those of you who have the chance to visit the CTBTO headquarters in Vienna, I recommend the tour of the radionuclide detection equipment on the roof. It’s really impressive!

In closing, I will reiterate that we have a lot of work to do, but the goal is worthy. An in-force CTBT will benefit the United States and indeed, the whole world.

Let’s get to work on it together. Thank you.

US Statement: Gulf Cooperation Council and Ballistic Missile Defense

pbaxter7 — Sun, 18 May 2014 15:09:32 +0000

US Statement: Gulf Cooperation Council and Ballistic Missile Defense

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Official Statement

pbaxter7 Sun, 05/18/2014 - 11:09

Gulf Cooperation Council and Ballistic Missile Defense

Remarks

Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Peter Huessy Breakfast Series; Capitol Hill Club

Washington, DC

May 14, 2014

Thank you, Peter, for that kind introduction and for hosting me again at this series.

I’m very happy to be with you today to address our efforts in working with Gulf Cooperation Council to enhance Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation in the region, as I have just recently returned from the Middle East Missile & Air Defense Symposium in Abu Dhabi.

In my remarks this morning, I’d like to accomplish two things. First, I’d like to share with you a bit about my most recent discussions on missile defense with our partners in the Gulf. Second, I’d like to outline the key takeaways from my latest trip to the region, chief among them is the progress that has been made in developing regional missile defenses with the Gulf Cooperation Council. After that, I’m happy to take your questions.

U.S. Commitment to Gulf Security, Including Missile Defense

As you know, this is a time of profound change in that region. We are experiencing perhaps an unprecedented moment of engagement and dialogue with nations around the world. At the same time, we are also acutely aware of the daily threats and anxieties felt throughout the Gulf.

As you also know, security cooperation has long stood at the core of the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States is not only committed to enhancing U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation – we see it as a strategic imperative.

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to expand international efforts and cooperation on ballistic missile defense. BMD cooperation contributes to regional stability by deterring regional actors, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of their systems, and assuring allies and partners both of the U.S. commitments and by enhancing their ability to defend against these threats should they become necessary.

The message I delivered in the region was clear: the United States remains firmly committed to developing and deploying advanced missile defense capabilities around the world to protect our homeland, our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies who depend on us for security.

It’s worth mentioning that U.S.-GCC security cooperation extends well beyond the topic of today’s discussion, or BMD. Maritime security is an important focus, given the massive commercial and energy resources that traverse the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. And U.S. and Gulf experts are now meeting as a group to exchange best practices on counterterrorism and border security, within which cyber security is becoming an increasingly prominent topic. Stated plainly, we are committed to working with our GCC partners to strengthen multilateral defense cooperation as an important complement to our strong bilateral partnerships in the region. To help reach that goal, in December 2013 President Obama designated the GCC eligible for Foreign Military Sales. Among other benefits, this designation helps lay the groundwork for the GCC states to address regional ballistic missile defense through multilateral procurement.

That’s the same designation we’ve given NATO, allowing the GCC to invest in shared systems for mutual defense, even as the United States continues a strong bilateral defense partnership with each individual GCC member state. And it demonstrates our commitment to the U.S.-Gulf Partnership, and our ultimate commitment to see the Gulf become a stronger, more capable partner in confronting the many challenges to our shared interests in the region. Earlier today, Secretary Hagel met with his Gulf counterparts in Jeddah for the first ever U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial, which likewise signals U.S. intent to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and multilateral ties in this critical region.

Progress on Regional Missile Defense

The President’s address at the United Nations General Assembly last fall reaffirmed our continued commitment to Gulf security. Indeed, my principal takeaway from the trip was that our security commitments and partnerships in the Gulf are more extensive today than ever before.

As I discussed several weeks ago in Abu Dhabi, the March 2012 launch of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, or SCF, has enhanced our partnership on policies that advance shared political, security, military, and economic objectives in the Gulf, including intensified efforts on ballistic missile defense cooperation.

At his first Forum last September, Secretary of State John Kerry, my boss, made clear that a top U.S.-GCC priority would continue to be enhancing ballistic missile defense cooperation, including the eventual development of Gulf-wide coordinated missile defense architecture. And we can expect BMD to have been a primary focus at today’s inaugural U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial.

Burden Sharing

It was clear from my discussions with our partners in the region that the GCC shares our goal of building an effective regional defense against the threat of ballistic missiles, and is willing and ready to defend its own security future.

Several of our Gulf state partners expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the U.A.E.’s security as well as regional stability. The U.A.E. also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets.

Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait also is upgrading its existing batteries to PAC-3, and in December 2013 signed an offer for two additional PAC-3 batteries.

These procurements demonstrate our GCC partners’ determination to provide for their own defense, and when combined with our regional BMD capabilities, represent a significant contribution to regional stability at a time when our own defense spending is under fiscal pressure.

Our GCC partners are investing billions of dollars in missile defense purchases. In today’s austere budget environment, these investments can help achieve greater economies of scale.

Military and Diplomatic Coordination

And I’ll close by looking ahead towards next steps on BMD in the region.

Effective ballistic missile defense is not based on military might alone. Advanced, interoperable systems to intercept and destroy attacking missiles must be combined with diplomatic cooperation and coordination.

Ballistic missiles can destabilize and weaken a region due to their short flight times and potentially devastating consequences. WMD armed missiles in particular can have broad consequences not only within a targeted country but within a region, as the effects of a successful attack are not always limited to that country. And even conventionally armed missiles can be a significant military threat.

But ballistic missiles are also a weapon of choice for an adversary that wants to gain political influence over its regional neighbors. We have seen ballistic missile test firings used as a tool to intimidate, blackmail, or coerce a country’s neighbors.

The nature of the ballistic missile threat means that the United States, and the GCC, must be prepared both diplomatically and militarily well before the first missile is launched.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense work as active partners in the Strategic Cooperation Forum to emphasize the need for planning, both diplomatic and military, when it comes to ballistic missile defense.

In fact, our dialogues within the SCF include representatives from the Defense Department and U.S. Air Forces Central Command for one clear reason: because ballistic missile defense requires a whole-of-government approach.

To facilitate further a dialogue with our Gulf partners on BMD issues, President Obama obtained authority from Congress expanding the authority of the U.S. Air Force to conduct integrated air and missile defense training at the U.S.-U.A.E. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center, which is located in the United Arab Emirates. These integrated defense trainings are uniquely positioned to play a key role in advancing regional BMD policies, procedures, and cooperation.

At a strategic level, we must continue to encourage better planning and preparation among both our military leaders and our senior diplomats. It should also be our shared task with the Gulf to develop strategic communications plans and ensure close and effective consultations with regional partners to advance our joint security and prosperity.

The U.S.-Gulf partnership can therefore bring together the strength of our combined forces with the skill of our strategic planning. We will be much more successful in advancing our shared interests by working together than by going it alone.

Missile Defense Cooperation with Israel

And finally, I want to note that our cooperation with the GCC states will in no way detract from the separate, robust U.S.-Israel BMD cooperation program. Since 2003, the Department of Defense, with the help of Congress, has provided nearly $2.5 billion to Israel to help develop a number of missile defense systems including Iron Dome, Arrow, and David's Sling. This includes $440 million in FY 13 alone. Throughout the development of these systems, our goal has been to ensure there are no shortages in these important systems and that U.S. investments meet Israel's security needs and production capacity.

The President's budget requests $96.8 million in FY15 for Arrow and David’s Sling, and $176 million for Iron Dome. By the end of FY15, the United States will have provided over $875 million in funding for Iron Dome.

Conclusion

In conclusion, ballistic missile defense issues cross military and, most importantly for us at the State Department, diplomatic equities. Moving forward, we hope to encourage deepened understanding and engagement in the Gulf on the need to combine diplomatic and military knowledge and expertise to address the full range of issues on effective missile defenses and strengthen the larger strategic deterrent architecture.

The United States will continue to work closely with each of our partners in the GCC to help them strengthen their capacity. Enhanced missile defense capabilities among the GCC not only protect our partners from the growing regional threat, but strengthened regional deterrence architecture ultimately keeps our interests, and our homeland, secure.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

US Delegation Statement at NPT PrepCom: NPT Cluster 2: Regional Issues

pbaxter7 — Sat, 03 May 2014 15:46:53 +0000

US Delegation Statement at NPT PrepCom: NPT Cluster 2: Regional Issues

Publication Categories

Official Statement

pbaxter7 Sat, 05/03/2014 - 11:46

NPT Cluster 2: Regional Issues

Remarks

Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

U.S. Statement at the Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

United Nations, New York City

May 1, 2014

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation would like address a number of regional challenges to the integrity and authority of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty which has served the security interests of all states.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States and our E3+3 partners are engaged in a process aimed at peacefully resolving one of the most serious challenges to the integrity and credibility of the global nonproliferation regime: Iran’s nuclear program. The E3+3 and Iran have been meeting intensively since February to discuss all of the issues that must be resolved as part of a long-term comprehensive solution that resolves the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, verifiably ensures that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, ensures Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon, and returns Iran to full compliance with its NPT and other nonproliferation obligations. These discussions have been useful and constructive, and all sides are showing good faith.

In parallel, the IAEA is continuing its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including its possible military dimensions. We commend the IAEA for the professional, objective, and diligent manner in which it has conducted its efforts. It remains essential and urgent for Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to address all present and past issues to resolve the international community’s legitimate concerns and advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution.

We look forward to the international community’s continued support for the E3+3’s efforts in the weeks and months ahead, which remains essential as we pursue a comprehensive diplomatic resolution which returns Iran to full compliance with its NPT obligations and would result in Iran being treated in the same manner as any other non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

With regard to Syria, it has been nearly three years since the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. The Asad regime’s continued failure to uphold Syria’s nonproliferation obligations reinforces the international community’s strong concerns regarding the continued potential for covert nuclear activities in Syria. It remains essential that the Asad regime Syria cooperate fully with the IAEA to remedy its noncompliance.

As we have made clear, the instability and violence the regime has wrought against its own people is no excuse for its failure to meet Syria’s international obligations. Its noncompliance with its safeguards agreement remains a matter of serious and continuing concern to the international community. We commend the IAEA’s efforts to resolve Syria’s noncompliance.

Mr. Chairman,

These cases of noncompliance undermine our efforts to achieve the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The United States continues to fully support this goal, and we stand by our commitment to convene a conference [freely arrived at by the states in the region] to discuss the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

There is significant progress since last year’s PrepCom meeting. Regional states have participated in three rounds of multilateral consultations in Switzerland, moving closer to consensus on an agenda and modalities for a conference. Direct engagement among the parties in the region is an essential step forward. We encourage the parties to continue discussions and continue the positive tone all parties – both our Arab friends and Israel – have displayed. The fact that three rounds of consultations have been held over a six month period and that statements in the small room in Glion were more positive than what we hear in this hall, is itself a confidence building measure, and one that has helped advance this process considerably.

Ambassador Laajava has proposed additional meetings following this PrepCom meeting and we commend him for his leadership and intensive efforts to bring the parties together. These consultations are an important element of preparation, but do not replace the conference itself. We hope that all states in the region take full advantage of this opportunity, to attend the consultations, to seek solutions in good faith and above all, to do what the states of Africa, the states of Latin America, the states of Southeast Asia, and other regions have done: to take ownership of the process and responsibility for the difficult compromises ahead.

Beyond the conference, actual achievement of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is a long-term undertaking, and will require that essential conditions be in place in order to achieve it. These conditions include a comprehensive and durable peace in the region, and ensuring full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations.

In addition, Mr. Chairman,

A critical and growing threat to the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime, and to our common peace and security, is North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Despite consistent calls to correct course, North Korea continues to act in direct defiance of the clear and overwhelming international consensus that the DPRK must abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs – including plutonium production and uranium enrichment – and cease all related activities immediately.

As we have made clear, the United States remains open to a meaningful and authentic diplomatic process to implement the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization. However, the onus remains on North Korea to make the right choice – its recent actions and threats indicate that it is intent on defiance over denuclearization. Together with our partners in the Six-Party process, we are focused on urging North Korea to take meaningful actions toward verifiable denuclearization and refrain from further provocations.

Our message to North Korea is clear. The international community will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. We seek its return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards as a non-nuclear weapon state party and to full compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. We also call on North Korea to make a firm commitment and concrete progress toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, and join the community of responsible nations.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States looks forward to continuing to work closely with our fellow NPT parties to address these important challenges and to uphold this vital instrument of global peace and security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Remarks on the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

pbaxter7 — Thu, 01 May 2014 12:43:33 +0000

Remarks on the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

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Official Statement

pbaxter7 Thu, 05/01/2014 - 08:43

Remarks on the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

Remarks

Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Washington, DC

April 28, 2014

Hi everyone, I’m Tom Countryman, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of State. I will be heading our U.S. Delegation to the 2014 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting, or the NPT PrepCom, at the UN in New York from April 28th to May 9th. This will be the third and final PrepCom leading up to the NPT Review Conference in 2015.

In New York, our delegation will work with representatives from 189 NPT states parties to strengthen the Treaty and set the stage for 2015. The NPT Review Conference is held every five years, and in 2015 we look to build upon the success of the 2010 NPT RevCon, where the conference approved a comprehensive, 64-item Action Plan, the first of its kind in the NPT’s forty-four year history.

The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. The NPT’s three mutually reinforcing pillars focus on 1-) halting the further spread of nuclear weapons 2-) continuing down the path of further reductions in existing nuclear arsenals toward our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and 3-) promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology under appropriate safeguards.

President Obama reaffirmed our commitment to the NPT in Prague in 2009 and again in Berlin last year. In Prague the President said, "The basic bargain [embodied in the NPT] is sound… Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy."

At this final PrepCom before the 2015 Review Conference, the United States will encourage parties to take stock of progress made in implementing the 2010 Action Plan, identify remaining obstacles, and work to find common ground on ways to overcome them. We look forward to reporting detailed information on our efforts to translate these actions into accomplishments.

Over the course of the PrepCom, the United States will use a variety of ways to present the work we have completed on all three pillars of the NPT in a variety of different ways. For example, we will issue a national report on the steps that we have taken to implement key elements of the 2010 Action Plan that uses a common framework agreed by all five nuclear weapon states. We will also highlight our contributions to International Atomic Energy Agency programs harnessing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for efforts like fighting disease, improving food security, and managing water resources.

We look forward to highlighting these and other accomplishments, whether from the floor of the UN, in side events with other countries and nongovernmental organizations, or through other activities planned. We do this with one goal in mind: to strengthen the NPT so that it remains a durable norm and bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Much has been accomplished, but more work remains. We look forward to making additional progress on this important issue at the PrepCom and 2015 Review Conference. Thank you.

Twenty Years of Renunciation From Nuclear Weapons by Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament

pbaxter7 — Wed, 30 Apr 2014 14:07:15 +0000

Twenty Years of Renunciation From Nuclear Weapons by Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament

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Official Statement

pbaxter7 Wed, 04/30/2014 - 10:07

Twenty Years of Renunciation From Nuclear Weapons by Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Prospects of Nuclear Disarmament

Remarks

Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations

New York City

April 28, 2014

Introduction

The 2014 PrepCom is an opportunity to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to reinforce our shared responsibilities to uphold it. The United States remains committed to full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Through this PrepCom we will build on the momentum of the successful 2010 Review Conference and PrepComs in 2012 and 2013. As we approach the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States looks to all States Parties to work together towards strengthening this critical treaty which has underpinned international security for nearly 45 years.

I thank our Ukrainian friends for hosting us today. As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have said, the United States strongly supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Last week, Vice President Biden traveled to Kyiv in order to demonstrate our solidarity with the Ukrainian people. He discussed how the United States is supporting the international community’s efforts to stabilize and strengthen Ukraine’s economy and assist Ukraine in political reform and uniting the country. The Vice President announced a U.S. package of assistance totaling $50 million to help Ukraine pursue political and economic reform and strengthen our partnership. He made clear that Ukraine has a difficult road ahead, but it will not walk this road alone. And today the United States announced that it will impose new targeted sanctions on a number of Russian individuals and entities and restricting licenses for certain U.S. exports to Russia.

Budapest Memorandum Commitments

In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom made a commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine. The United States government remains committed to the Budapest Memorandum.

Our partnership with Ukraine goes back many years, and is particularly strong in the area of nonproliferation. We appreciate Ukraine’s continued leadership in this area.

Ukraine’s Nonproliferation Record

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s historic decision to remove the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world from its territory and to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Ukraine’s unwavering commitment to its obligations under the NPT demonstrates that when a country places itself squarely within the NPT and diligently adheres to all of the Treaty’s obligations, all nations benefit.

Since 1994, Ukraine has a strong record of supporting nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction. With support from the “Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Ukraine dismantled an enormous stockpile of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and related delivery systems. In 2004, it began an augmented program with the U.S. Department of Defense that includes weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention and border security initiatives. By hosting the multilateral Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), Ukraine has engaged over 20,000 scientists from the former Soviet weapons program in peaceful activities. The United States has been proud to be a partner in those efforts.

Ukraine brought its IAEA safeguards agreement into force in 1995; it signed the Additional Protocol in 2000 and brought it into force in 2006. Ukraine joined the Global Partnership against the spread of WMD in 2005, in 2007 it was one of the first countries to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Ukraine participated actively in all three Nuclear Security Summits. In 2012, Ukraine fulfilled its pledge to remove all highly enriched uranium from Ukraine, a highlight of the 2012 Summit.

In 2013, we extended the U.S.-Ukraine Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement for another seven years, as well as an agreement to increase safety and risk reduction at civilian nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Recent events in Ukraine underline the importance of bringing to closure to the legacy of Chernobyl by finishing construction of a landmark shelter to durably protect the population and environment, a project to which the United States has pledged approximately $337 million. Last month, a joint U.S. – Ukraine project to construct a Neutron Source Facility at the Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology was completed, providing Ukraine with new research capabilities and the ability to produce industrial and medical isotopes. In short, U.S. – Ukrainian cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation is broad and deep.

U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation

We applaud Minister of Foreign Affairs Deshchytsia’s reaffirmation of Ukraine’s longstanding commitment to its nonproliferation obligations at the Nuclear Security Summit last month. Like Ukraine, the United States is committed to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This is a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda. There is a long road ahead, but we are working to create the conditions for its eventual achievement. As President Obama said in Berlin in June, 2013, the United States can ensure its security and that of its allies while safely pursuing further nuclear reductions with Russia of up to one-third in the deployed strategic warhead level established in the New START Treaty.

As next steps toward nuclear disarmament, the United States remains committed to pursuing entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and consensus to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

I would like to highlight the work done at the P5 Conference earlier this month in Beijing toward implementing the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference

The NPT serves as a key element of international security and the basis for international nuclear cooperation. We will continue to address the serious challenges of cases of noncompliance with Treaty obligations, and will continue to support expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We look forward to a productive Preparatory Committee meeting, and reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the Treaty’s contributions to international peace and security are strengthened.

I thank our Ukrainian hosts again for today and congratulate them again on this important anniversary and their continued leadership within the NPT. I look forward to working with Ukraine, and with all other NPT Parties, over the coming weeks to ensure that the NPT remains strong.

As Secretary Kerry stated last week, the world will remain united for Ukraine.

Press Release: Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security

pbaxter7 — Fri, 21 Mar 2014 14:02:23 +0000

Press Release: Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security

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Official Statement

pbaxter7 Fri, 03/21/2014 - 10:02

Arms Control and International Security: Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security

03/20/2014 03:09 PM EDT

Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security

The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, Russia, Spain, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Australia, and the Kingdom of Morocco on the occasion of the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to enhancing nuclear security.

Begin Text:

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) has made valuable contributions in strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. To date, the 85 partner nations have completed more than 60 activities under the auspices of the GICNT aimed at building partners’ capabilities in this area. We, the Co-Chairs of the GICNT (Russia and the United States), the past and present Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) Coordinators (Spain and Republic of Korea), and leaders of the three IAG Working Groups (the Kingdom of Morocco, the Netherlands and Australia) wish to inform the states in attendance at the 2014 Netherlands Nuclear Security Summit of the activities of the GICNT since the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the Republic of Korea in Seoul in March 2012.

Over 250 representatives of GICNT partner nations and representatives from all four GICNT official observers (the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)) participated in the eighth GICNT Plenary Meeting, hosted by Mexico in Mexico City on May 24, 2013. This robust participation demonstrates the vital importance that GICNT partner nations place on enhancing nuclear security and underscores their desire to work cooperatively to further this goal. At the Plenary meeting, GICNT partners recognized the valuable contribution of the IAG mechanism created at the June 2010 GICNT Plenary meeting in Abu Dhabi. The U.S. and Russian Co-Chairs further recognized the contributions of Spain in serving as the IAG Coordinator for three years, including organizing and chairing the Implementation and Assessment Group meetings in Arona and Ispra, Italy, in October 2012 and in Madrid, Spain, in February 2013. Through its leadership, Spain brought strong focus and coordination to GICNT activities. At the 2013 Plenary, the Republic of Korea was endorsed as the new IAG Coordinator.

The collaborative efforts fostered by the GICNT are especially significant in light of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and the 2014 The Hague Nuclear Security Summit. Already, GICNT collaboration has produced important results that complement the Nuclear Security Summit process and help advance critical elements addressed in the Summit:

The Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG), chaired by the Netherlands, is finalizing the Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture series of documents following the publication of Volume I, Model Guidelines Document for Nuclear Detection Architectures, in 2009. Volume II in the series, Guidelines for Awareness, Training, and Exercises, and Volume III, Guidelines for Planning and Organization, focused on issues inherent to successful implementation and enhancement of nuclear detection architectures. Ukraine hosted a meeting of the NDWG in Lviv in November 2012 to further the development of the third document in the series. Volumes II and III in the foundational series were approved at the May 2013 GICNT Plenary meeting. At a workshop hosted by Greece in Athens in October 2013, the NDWG continued work on Volume IV, Guidelines for Detection Within a State’s Interior, the final best practices guide in the series. Also during the Athens workshop, the NDWG began efforts to develop a tabletop exercise “playbook,” a compendium of detection-related exercise scenarios available to all GICNT partner nations.

The United Kingdom hosted the GICNT’s 2^nd Symposium on Enhanced Detection of Special Nuclear Material in November 2012, to take stock of current advancements in detection technologies, drawing widely on the experiences of other GICNT partner nations.

In September 2012, Russia conducted an exercise on nuclear detection, “Guardian 2012.” During the exercise, Russia used a realistic scenario and real time activity to demonstrate the different aspects of Russia’s national system for detecting nuclear threats, thereby further raising awareness of best practices for the practical implementation of basic principles of nuclear detection architectures in the framework of the GICNT.

In February 2014, Mexico hosted a field training exercise under the auspices of the NDWG, during which the participants had the opportunity to observe implementation of a radiation detection alarm adjudication process and interagency communications protocol in response to realistic nuclear detection scenarios at the Port of Manzanillo. This exercise highlighted national best practices in detection systems and in coordination of a domestic interagency response to a nuclear terrorism event.

The Nuclear Forensics Working Group (NFWG), chaired by Australia, completed a document entitled, Nuclear Forensics Fundamentals for Policy Makers and Decision Makers, which was endorsed at the GICNT Plenary Meeting in May 2013. This document is intended to raise policy maker and decision maker awareness of nuclear forensics as a tool to enhance nuclear material security and to prevent illicit uses of nuclear and other radioactive material. In May 2012, Australia hosted “Iron Koala,” a nuclear forensics seminar and tabletop exercise, which examined the importance of information sharing partnerships, both nationally and internationally, to effectively respond to cases related to nuclear smuggling. This exercise identified an interest amongst GICNT partners in further study of the topic of information sharing in the nuclear forensics field. Thus the working group has commenced development of a document seeking to frame the issues related to sharing nuclear forensics information in the response to and investigation of a nuclear terrorism-related event, currently titled Sharing Nuclear Forensics Information: Benefits, Resources, and Challenges.

Also under the auspices of the NFWG, the United Kingdom hosted in January 2014 the “Nuclear Forensics Workshop and Exercise – Exploring the Nuclear Forensics Chain of Custody: Guidance on the Development of Legally Compliant Nuclear Forensics Capabilities and Systems.” The workshop incorporated a tabletop exercise “Blue Beagle” that demonstrated the British system for control and use of forensics evidence from a crime scene through its development and presentation as evidence in a courtroom and to its disposal. The workshop and exercise presented best practices for investigating a crime scene contaminated with radioactive material and showcased the critical steps needed to successfully introduce the evidence into legal proceedings.

Additionally, awareness-building information modules based on the GICNT Global Initiative Information Portal (GIIP) are in development. Currently, the NFWG is testing a National Nuclear Forensics Library module that provides policy-makers an outline of the national nuclear forensics library concept and identifies key resources for partner nations interested in further information on this subject.

The Response and Mitigation Working Group (RMWG), chaired by the Kingdom of Morocco, is working collaboratively to develop the Response and Mitigation Framework Document, a collection of key considerations that a country with limited capabilities should consider when initializing its national nuclear/radiological emergency response system. This document includes substantial input from the Moroccan experience in setting up its response capabilities. The Framework Document is intended as a living document, meant to be routinely updated and improved through follow-on practical activities and further input from partner nations. In its capacity as RMWG Chair, Morocco continues to work on an action plan for future activities aimed at strengthening GICNT partner capabilities in responding to a nuclear terrorism event. Morocco continues to work on an action plan for future RMWG activities aimed at strengthening GICNT partner capabilities in responding to a nuclear terrorism incident.

Under the auspices of the RMWG, Canada hosted the RADEX exercise in May 2012 in Toronto, to provide an overview of Canada’s emergency management and national security authorities and demonstrate its response to a terrorist attack. Spain and Morocco jointly hosted the REMEX-2013 exercise, in Madrid, Spain, in April 2013. This exercise helped to test the national capabilities of both countries and their cooperation on responding to and mitigating simultaneous terrorist attacks involving radioactive substances.

In October 2012, the RMWG and NWFG met jointly in Ispra, Italy, to address the intersections of the two working groups in responding to nuclear and radiological events. Based on the success of this joint activity, in February 2014, the NFWG and RMWG jointly held a workshop incorporating the tabletop exercise “Tiger Reef” focused on interagency coordination and training that highlighted best practices and key resources for integrating cross-disciplinary training into national response frameworks. “Tiger Reef” was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur and was supported by Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia.

Looking to the future, the GICNT Co-Chairs, the IAG Coordinator and the Working Group Leaders remain committed to working with GICNT partner nations to pursue focused efforts and activities that foster nuclear security collaboration and advance nuclear security goals. Moving forward, the GICNT leadership will seek to engage partner nations in practical exercises and workshops that enable them to prepare for and practice responding to nuclear security events. Such activities will focus on encouraging interagency, regional, and international cooperation and communication, in accordance with the proposals for GICNT work endorsed by the partners at the 2013 Plenary meeting in Mexico City. By enhancing partner nations’ capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, GICNT will continue to strengthen nuclear security capabilities globally through efforts that complement and support the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit.

Arms Control and International Security: Meeting Emerging Nonproliferation Challenges: U.S. Department Programs

Anonymous — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 15:44:09 +0000

Arms Control and International Security: Meeting Emerging Nonproliferation Challenges: U.S. Department Programs

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Official Statement

Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 04/01/2013 - 11:44

http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2013/206800.htm

The proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, as well as conventional weapons that can be used to destabilize societies present grave threats to national, regional, and global security. As responsible nations tighten their controls on trade in conventional military technologies, unscrupulous individuals, organizations, and states shift their attention to acquisition of so-called dual-use goods. These goods have legitimate commercial applications, but can also be used to support illicit WMD or ballistic missile programs.

Bibliography

Simon Limage
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Center for International Trade & Security -- University of Georgia

Athens, GA

March 29, 2013

Major General Zhu Chenghu on China's attitudes towards arms control treaties

Anonymous — Sun, 17 Mar 2013 15:45:55 +0000

Major General Zhu Chenghu on China's attitudes towards arms control treaties

Publication Categories

Official Statement

Anonymous (not verified) Sun, 03/17/2013 - 11:45

On February 5, 2013 at the Emory University China Speaker Series, Major General Zhu Chenhu of the Chinese National Defense University gave this response to my question about Chinese attitudes towards signing arms control treaties. See below 4 minute video clip from the talk. It raises a number of questions:

What makes a treaty an "unfair" treaty in Chinese eyes?

Will China adhere exactly to the letter of treaties it signs? Is verification essential in treaties?

How does the Chinese commitment to "non-interference" square with the need to bring countries into the NPT and CTBT with verification?

Why is China not willing to take the lead in negotiating arms control treaties?

If the Chinese public believe that an issue of sovereignty is at stake, can the Chinese leadership sign a treaty on that issues? For example, can the Chinese leadership negotiate and sign a treaty with Japan over the Diaoyu islands?

Video (4 min) >

Bibliography

Emory University China Speaker Series

The U.S.-China Relationship at a Crossroads

February 5, 2013

Major General Zhu Chenghu

Other Disarmament Issues and International Security Segment of Thematic Debate in the First Committee of the Sixty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Anonymous — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 16:58:48 +0000

Other Disarmament Issues and International Security Segment of Thematic Debate in the First Committee of the Sixty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly

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Official Statement

Anonymous (not verified) Tue, 11/27/2012 - 11:58

There is now broad recognition among many States, including the United States, that existing international law serves as the appropriate framework applicable to activity in cyberspace in a variety of contexts, including in connection with hostilities. This area of international law involves two related bodies of law. The first one is jus ad bellum, which is the framework that addresses the use of force triggering a State’s right of self-defense; and the second one is jus in bello, which is the body of law governing the conduct of hostilities in the context of an armed conflict and is sometimes called the international law of armed conflict, the law of war, or international humanitarian law.

Bibliography

Remarks

Statement by Delegation of the United States of America

New York City

November 2, 2012