Research Reports

The debate surrounding U.S. nuclear policy focuses too narrowly on reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the American arsenal toward zero. More important is preventing the use of nuclear weapons in whatever numbers they exist. President Barack Obama should articulate a narrowed framework for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons that the United States believes would be defensible for others to follow as long as nuclear weapons remain.

A More Defensible Nuclear Doctrine

Threat assessment: The first use of nuclear weapons is unnecessary or irrelevant to defeat threats to the territory of the United States today. However, some U.S. allies face potential threats that they rely on the United States to deter, including via possible first use of nuclear weapons. The United States and other states tend to exaggerate the threats that justify their reliance on first-use nuclear deterrence, but all nuclear-armed states can do more to clarify that they will not seek or employ capabilities that could cause others legitimately to use nuclear weapons in self-defense.

The proposed policy in a nutshell: The United States should declare that it possesses nuclear weapons only to respond to, and thereby deter or defeat, threats to its survival or that of its allies, particularly stemming from any use of nuclear weapons.

Differences from existing policy: This policy would raise the threshold of nuclear use to “threats to survival” instead of “extreme circumstances.” The first use of nuclear weapons would be allowed only in response to existential threats to the United States or its allies, eschewing attempts to conduct disarming first strikes against Russia or China. The policy would be more consistent with U.S. interests in strategic stability and more consonant with just war doctrine and international law.

Objectives of Nuclear Policy

Contribute to overall deterrence of threats to the survival of the United States and its allies.
Minimize probability of any nuclear use and escalation.
Reduce incentives for other states to acquire or expand nuclear arsenals.
Enhance credibility of the deterrence policy by making it a model that the United States would recognize as morally and legally defensible if other nuclear-armed states copied it.

Guidelines for Implementation

If non-nuclear means fail, nuclear weapons could be used to defeat, through direct destruction of military forces and demonstration of escalatory risks, any existence-threatening incursion into the territory of the United States or that of an ally, and eliminate the adversary’s will to continue the war.
Disarming first strikes against Russian or Chinese nuclear forces would be eschewed because they are not feasible, and if they were feasible, or were perceived to be feasible, they would drive Moscow and Beijing to seek countervailing capabilities and policies that would make the United States less secure.
U.S. retaliation for an adversary’s nuclear first use would be directed to destroy the military and security apparatus and leadership of the attacking state.

Concrete Steps Forward

This policy could be conveyed in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Posture Review, which is due in 2014.
The policy could be central to the debate on reducing the role of nuclear weapons at the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Bibliography

A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament: Individual Country Reports

tzhao3 — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 18:01:14 +0000

A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament: Individual Country Reports

Publication Categories

Research Reports

tzhao3 Fri, 04/26/2013 - 14:01

A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament: Individual Country Reports

Tamara Patton, Pavel Podvig, and Phillip Schell

UNIDIR

Bibliography

Chasing Mirages: Australia and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella in the Asia-Pacific

tzhao3 — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 16:50:23 +0000

Chasing Mirages: Australia and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella in the Asia-Pacific

Publication Categories

Research Reports

tzhao3 Mon, 03/25/2013 - 12:50

Chasing Mirages: Australia and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella in the Asia-Pacific

By Christine M. Leah and Crispin Rovere

Bibliography

ISA 2013 Panel on Continuity and Change in Nuclear Diplomacy: "Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments"

Anonymous — Fri, 22 Mar 2013 12:10:50 +0000

ISA 2013 Panel on Continuity and Change in Nuclear Diplomacy: "Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments"

Publication Categories

Research Reports

Anonymous (not verified) Fri, 03/22/2013 - 08:10

Why do countries deploy nuclear weapons abroad? Since 1945, more than 20 states have hosted foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, and five countries continue to do so today. These deployments have important consequences for international security, yet there is little systematic research about the factors that drive them. In this article, we develop three broad theoretical frameworks to explain why foreign nuclear deployments occur. Using a new dataset of foreign nuclear deployments between 1945 and 2000, we find that two factors weigh heavily in driving these deployments: the protection of allies and the projection of military power. Nonproliferation motives, however, appear to play little role. The results carry important implications for our understanding of the causes of proliferation and the sources of nuclear posture.

Bibliography

ISA 2013 Panel on Continuity and Change in Nuclear Diplomacy

ISA 2013 Panel on Continuity and Change in Nuclear Diplomacy: "Why the Development of Epistemic Community Does Not Necessarily Lead to Nuclear Arms Control Cooperation"

Anonymous — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 16:33:17 +0000

ISA 2013 Panel on Continuity and Change in Nuclear Diplomacy: "Why the Development of Epistemic Community Does Not Necessarily Lead to Nuclear Arms Control Cooperation"

Publication Categories

Research Reports

Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 03/18/2013 - 12:33

A Case Study of U.S.-China Cooperation in Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiation

Bibliography

International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, April 2013