Policy Memos

Policy Memo for “Security Competition and Denuclearization: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and International Strategic Choices”

ZZhong — Thu, 12 May 2016 00:15:00 +0000

Policy Memo for “Security Competition and Denuclearization: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and International Strategic Choices”

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Policy Memos

ZZhong Wed, 05/11/2016 - 20:15

The North Korean Nuclear Crisis is a manifestation of the security competition among the key stakeholders, especially the two Koreas, the United States and China. In this paper, I argue that the competing vision of national security interests/objectives and the existence of “security competition” by major players in Northeast Asia under the particular international structure provide both constraints and opportunities for the formation of this re-emerged stalemate and the potential resolution of the nuclear crisis. Failure to moderate security competition among the four key players, i.e., DPRK, ROK, China and the U.S., is the real reason that leads to the deadlock.

Bibliography

Zhong Zhenming
Associate Professor, School of Political Science and International Relations, Tongji
University, Shanghai, 200092, China

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Zhong - policy memo.pdf

Re-imagining global nuclear ordering beyond proliferation and deterrence: Implication for progressive nuclear weapons policy

Benoît Pelopidas — Wed, 11 May 2016 18:25:29 +0000

Re-imagining global nuclear ordering beyond proliferation and deterrence: Implication for progressive nuclear weapons policy

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Policy Memos

Benoît Pelopidas Wed, 05/11/2016 - 14:25

The importance of arms control and of the goal of strategic stability in the US nuclear weapons policy toolkit since the 1970s suggest that it is a fundamentally conservative realm of policymaking and that this conservative aspect might be good news as, in the nuclear realm maybe more than anywhere else. However, in nuclear weapons policy as in other areas, decision-making cannot be oriented towards pure stasis. This is why the study of the conditions of possibility of progressive nuclear weapons policy is crucial.

Bibliography

Benoit Pelopidas

Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Bristol, Affiliate of CISAC, Stanford University and visiting fellow at the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies for 2015-2016.

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Pelopidas_POSSE2015_Policy_memo.pdf

Moscow’s emerging electronic warfare capabilities: a dangerous jammer on U.S./NATO-Russian relations?

ALoukianova — Wed, 11 May 2016 18:22:48 +0000

Moscow’s emerging electronic warfare capabilities: a dangerous jammer on U.S./NATO-Russian relations?

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Policy Memos

ALoukianova Wed, 05/11/2016 - 14:22

Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have given Russia an opportunity to test the employment of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities that Moscow has developed over the last decade in order to deter and counter military threats from the West. To be sure, Western analysts have foreseen the emergence of Russia’s anti-access/area denial capabilities, including advanced electronic counter measures (ECM), for over a decade. What arguably came as a surprise is the demonstrative nature of Russia’s use of these capabilities. Since 2014, Moscow has provocatively operated EW systems in close proximity to U.S. forces and widely publicized these developments in state-run media organizations. In response to these actions, U.S./NATO officials have expressed concerns with regard to implications for Western military operations, especially those conducted in close quarters with Russian forces.

Bibliography

Anya Loukianova is a PhD candidate, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park and a graduate fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM).

Related Files

Loukianova_POSSE_summary memo.pdf

Policy Memo on Governing North-East Asia Security: Nuclear Non-proliferation & Strategic Reconciliation

HLiu — Wed, 20 Apr 2016 15:10:26 +0000

Policy Memo on Governing North-East Asia Security: Nuclear Non-proliferation & Strategic Reconciliation

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Policy Memos

HLiu Wed, 04/20/2016 - 11:10

Huaping Liu
School of International Relations
Beijing Language & Culture University
hp_liu@hotmail.com

The Balance of Power in a Nuclear-Armed World

cmcdermott6 — Fri, 17 Jul 2015 19:09:01 +0000

The Balance of Power in a Nuclear-Armed World

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Policy Memos

cmcdermott6 Fri, 07/17/2015 - 15:09

The energy and enthusiasm generated by President Obama’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons has cooled substantially, a change reflected at the latest Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, which ended with no final resolution or document. This latest failure feeds a generalized anxiety about the decline of the Nonproliferation Regime, a sense that an accumulation of small failures will lead to a tipping point after which the regime will no longer be able to play a role in generating the stable expectations that keep it politically meaningful.

Bibliography

Dr. Anne I. Harrington

ETH Zurich

FAS: Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

pbaxter7 — Thu, 18 Sep 2014 18:48:42 +0000

FAS: Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

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Policy Memos

pbaxter7 Thu, 09/18/2014 - 14:48

Negotiations are currently underway with Iran regarding their nuclear program; as a result, one of the main questions for U.S. government policymakers is what monitoring and verification measures and tools will be required by the United States, its allies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful.

To answer this question, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) convened a non-partisan, independent task force to examine the technical and policy requirements to adequately verify a comprehensive or other sustained nuclear agreement with Iran. Through various methods, the task force interviewed or met with over 70 experts from various technical and policy disciplines and compiled the results in the new report, “Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran.” Authored by task force leaders Christopher Bidwell, Orde Kittrie, John Lauder and Harvey Rishikof, the report outlines nine recommendations for U.S. policymakers relating to a successful monitoring and verification agreement with Iran. They are as follows:

Six Elements of an Effective Agreement

1. The agreement should require Iran to provide, prior to the next phase of sanctions relief, a comprehensive declaration that is correct and complete concerning all aspects of its nuclear program both current and past.

2. The agreement should provide the IAEA, for the duration of the agreement, access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, as currently required by UN Security Council Resolution 1929.

3. The agreement should provide that any material acts of non-cooperation with inspectors are a violation of the agreement.

4. The agreement should provide for the establishment of a consultative commission, which should be designed and operate in ways to maximize its effectiveness in addressing disputes and, if possible, building a culture of compliance within Iran.

5. The agreement should provide that all Iranian acquisition of sensitive items for its post-agreement licit nuclear program, and all acquisition of sensitive items that could be used in a post-agreement illicit nuclear program, must take place through a designated transparent channel.

6. The agreement should include provisions designed to preclude Iran from outsourcing key parts of its nuclear weapons program to a foreign country such as North Korea.

Three Proposed U.S. Government Actions to Facilitate Effective Implementation of an Agreement

1. The U.S. Government should enhance its relevant monitoring capabilities, invest resources in monitoring the Iran agreement, and structure its assessment and reporting of any Iranian noncompliance so as to maximize the chances that significant anomalies will come to the fore and not be overlooked or considered de minimis.

2. The U.S. Government and its allies should maintain the current sanctions regime architecture so that it can be ratcheted up incrementally in order to deter and respond commensurately to any Iranian non-compliance with the agreement.

3. The U.S. Government should establish a joint congressional/executive branch commission to monitor compliance with the agreement, similar to Congress having created the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

Full Report available here.

Report summary and findings available here.

STABILITY FOR SECURITY OR SECURITY FOR STABILITY? Reflecting Upon Strategic Stability Motives in Security Policy

Anonymous — Fri, 25 Oct 2013 20:15:36 +0000

STABILITY FOR SECURITY OR SECURITY FOR STABILITY? Reflecting Upon Strategic Stability Motives in Security Policy

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Policy Memos

Anonymous (not verified) Fri, 10/25/2013 - 16:15

Strategic stability emerged as a concept in the Cold War realities of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stand-off, concentrating on avoidance of an all-out nuclear war break-out during a crisis. In an era of profound interdependence, it was recognized a key to maintaining security and peace among nuclear armed nations being opponents or foes.

The Cold War strategic stability analysis focused entirely on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition, specifically on their intercontinental nuclear capabilities. However, even though stability notion in the Cold War strategic lexicon has always had its entire focus on nuclear arsenals, there has been no particular discourse on “nuclear stability” which would narrowly emphasize the ‘nuclear nature’ of the issues covered by the concept. Instead, the wording of “strategic stability” suggests the focus on the stabilizing effect for a critically important matter, i.e. a matter of the highest, strategic priority.

Bibliography

Julia Fetisova, Ph.D.

PIR Center (The Russian Center for Policy Studies)

Policy Memo: Open Skies

Anonymous — Wed, 23 Oct 2013 16:00:09 +0000

Policy Memo: Open Skies

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Policy Memos

Anonymous (not verified) Wed, 10/23/2013 - 12:00

The Open Skies treaty is an agreement between 34 states in the Euro-Atlantic region providing for mutual aerial overflights of their sovereign territories, without restrictions on access. During an overflight, representatives of observer nations —in cooperation with representatives of the observed nation—photograph military-significant objects. This imagery is then pooled into a common data bank accessible to all treaty signatories, allowing them to observe the overflown states’ force posture and military infrastructure.

Open Skies is an important accord for several reasons. First, given the Euro- Atlantic’s history with the offensive use of airpower, states’ agreement on and implementation of a mechanism for cooperative aerial reconnaissance contributes to the emergence of permanent peace in the region. Second, from a policy process perspective, the 1992 conclusion and the eventual entry into force of the treaty is no short of an accident. Third, Open Skies has attracted attention from civil society and scientists as a potential monitoring mechanism at low numbers and at zero.

PROBLEM SUMMARY

Today, Open Skies faces an uncertain future due to questions about its continued relevance and cost-effectiveness, briefly described below. As some quip, the regime is a victim of its own success in building regional confidence and security. This memo discusses strategies to buttress support for the regime’s continued relevance.

Bibliography

Anya Loukianova

Policy Memo: Are Nuclear Weapons Shields for Aggression?

Anonymous — Wed, 23 Oct 2013 15:07:29 +0000

Policy Memo: Are Nuclear Weapons Shields for Aggression?

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Policy Memos

Anonymous (not verified) Wed, 10/23/2013 - 11:07

How would the world change if Iran acquires a nuclear arsenal? Not as much as you might think, according to our recent analysis of state behavior in the nuclear age.

Bibliography

2013 Policy Memo
Are Nuclear Weapons Shields for Aggression?
Matthew Fuhrmann

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University

This memo is based on joint research with Todd S. Sechser.

Policy Memo on The Endurance and Persistence of China's Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

Anonymous — Wed, 23 Oct 2013 05:26:19 +0000

Policy Memo on The Endurance and Persistence of China's Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

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Policy Memos

Anonymous (not verified) Wed, 10/23/2013 - 01:26

Based on an analysis of Chinese leaders’ speeches, official statements, and defense white papers published by Chinese government, my paper identifies some key elements of China’s nuclear doctrine as follows: (1) nuclear weapons as a tool of anti-nuclear blackmail and anti-nuclear coercion; (2) no-first-use; (3) minimal forces without comprising credibility; (4) modernization and survivability; (5) disarmament and non-proliferation. While acknowledging some doubts on the reliability and continuity of China’s basic elements of its nuclear doctrine, the article argues that China’s declared nuclear doctrine has a remarkable endurance and persistence if we look into the three key factors that shape the Chinese nuclear doctrine: traditional strategic thinking; the contrast of nuclear forces posture between China and other nuclear-possessed countries; and the transformation of China’s strategic environment. A closer examination of these factors and their impacts on China’s nuclear doctrine would suggest the following major findings and policy implications.

Bibliography

Policy Memo on The Endurance and Persistence of China's Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

Zhong Zhenming

School of Political Science and International Relations

Tongji University, China