This innovative study presents an in-depth political and sociological analysis of the internal power politics and imperial forms developed by the Russian neo-eurasianists and the neo-conservatives in the United States. It traces the growth of nationalism and the concept of 'Empire' in relation to the ideologies and foreign policy of both Russia and the USA.
Do nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence.
Why do countries deploy nuclear weapons abroad?
Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft.
Interest in nuclear energy has surged in recent years, yet there are risks that accompany the global diffusion of nuclear power—especially the possibility that the spread of nuclear energy will facilitate nuclear weapons proliferation. In this book, leading experts analyze the tradeoffs associated with nuclear energy and put the nuclear renaissance in historical context, evaluating both the causes and the strategic effects of nuclear energy development.
China and Russia are concerned about the development and deployment of U.S. conven- tional global strike systems that may change the existing offense/defense balance and threaten the credibility of their nuclear deterrent. This paper posits that a counterforce strike is more likely to target theater nuclear forces than intercontinental ballistic mis- siles and provides an analysis of the probability that U.S. conventional strikes might neutralize China’s theater nuclear forces, which include DF-3A, DF-4, DF-21, DF-31, Type 094 nuclear submarines, and nuclear-capable H-6 bombers.
“China’s Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation” in China Joins Global Governance: Cooperation and Contentions, ed. Mingjiang Li and Dongmin Lee, Lexington – The Rowman & Littlefield (2012).