The North Korean Nuclear Crisis is a manifestation of the security competition among the key stakeholders, especially the two Koreas, the United States and China. In this paper, I argue that the competing vision of national security interests/objectives and the existence of “security competition” by major players in Northeast Asia under the particular international structure provide both constraints and opportunities for the formation of this re-emerged stalemate and the potential resolution of the nuclear crisis.
The importance of arms control and of the goal of strategic stability in the US nuclear weapons policy toolkit since the 1970s suggest that it is a fundamentally conservative realm of policymaking and that this conservative aspect might be good news as, in the nuclear realm maybe more than anywhere else. However, in nuclear weapons policy as in other areas, decision-making cannot be oriented towards pure stasis. This is why the study of the conditions of possibility of progressive nuclear weapons policy is crucial.
Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have given Russia an opportunity to test the employment of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities that Moscow has developed over the last decade in order to deter and counter military threats from the West. To be sure, Western analysts have foreseen the emergence of Russia’s anti-access/area denial capabilities, including advanced electronic counter measures (ECM), for over a decade. What arguably came as a surprise is the demonstrative nature of Russia’s use of these capabilities.
The energy and enthusiasm generated by President Obama’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons has cooled substantially, a change reflected at the latest Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, which ended with no final resolution or document. This latest failure feeds a generalized anxiety about the decline of the Nonproliferation Regime, a sense that an accumulation of small failures will lead to a tipping point after which the regime will no longer be able to play a role in generating the stable expectations that keep it politically meaningful.
Strategic stability emerged as a concept in the Cold War realities of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stand-off, concentrating on avoidance of an all-out nuclear war break-out during a crisis. In an era of profound interdependence, it was recognized a key to maintaining security and peace among nuclear armed nations being opponents or foes.
The Open Skies treaty is an agreement between 34 states in the Euro-Atlantic region providing for mutual aerial overflights of their sovereign territories, without restrictions on access. During an overflight, representatives of observer nations —in cooperation with representatives of the observed nation—photograph military-significant objects. This imagery is then pooled into a common data bank accessible to all treaty signatories, allowing them to observe the overflown states’ force posture and military infrastructure.
How would the world change if Iran acquires a nuclear arsenal? Not as much as you might think, according to our recent analysis of state behavior in the nuclear age.
Based on an analysis of Chinese leaders’ speeches, official statements, and defense white papers published by Chinese government, my paper identifies some key elements of China’s nuclear doctrine as follows: (1) nuclear weapons as