Although the United States always argues that its ballistic missile defense (BMD) system is not against Russia and China, these two countries have not been convinced and believe that BMD would undermine strategic stability. This article will discuss the technical and political bases of China’s concerns and how to reach a solution of this dilemma. First, the intercept capability of U.S. BMD against Chinese strategic missiles will be analyzed, including current Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) system, Obama administration’s new BMD plan, U.S.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been founded as a global organization dedicating to monitor international nuclear activities, prevent nuclear proliferation and safeguard the nuclear peaceful use. Since the time of its coming into being, the Nuclear Safeguards System (NSS), which based on nuclear safeguards provisions of the IAEA and underpinned by nuclear Safeguards Model Agreements & Additional Protocol, has gone through an ever-changing and improving process.
While the world has entered into the second decade of 21st century, the global strategic pattern, having experienced the post-cold war period, has witnessed the trend of globalization. The international strategic environment has undergone significant changes: cooperation and competition are interwoven among countries and a multi-polar structure has been formed.
China’s nuclear deterrent capability relies on so-called “first strike uncertainty,” which means letting the other side be unconfident of a completely successful first strike. But the fact that the Soviet Union conducted nuclear threat against China in 1969 showed that first strike uncertainty must be high enough to deter nuclear attack or nuclear threat. This article examines the threshold. Only after China deployed the DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in mid-1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union began to believe China had some nuclear retaliatory capability. Chinese