Nuclear proliferation issue has occupied the central position of the North East Asia area for more than 20 years. Besides nuclear proliferation problem, there are still many other quarrels and disputes among the countries of this region. Instead of discussing the proliferation issue technically and tactically, this paper would like to place this issue under a wider strategic context to find a way out and mainly focus on the relationships between or among China, ROK and Japan.
How do leaders assess the intentions of their counterparts under uncertainty? This study
addresses this question by analyzing the development of nuclear programs. The technology
needed to build nuclear weapons and produce nuclear energy is indistinguishable. How,
then, can leaders identify a nuclear developer’s true intentions? An influential body of
literature suggests that costly signals play a key role in shaping states’ beliefs about whether a
developer of nuclear technology covets energy or bombs. I argue, however, that leader-centric
South Korea’s relationship with the United States, and particularly the varying security guarantees Washington has provided, have fundamentally shaped Seoul’s civil and military nuclear activities. Policymakers almost universally regard security guarantees as crucial tools to dissuade their recipients from bolstering their nuclear weapons-related capabilities or pursuing weapons outright. The causal relationship is more controversial among scholars, though robust empirical evidence suggests that policymakers are correct in their assessments.
From Anne Harrington's latest article, she writes, "From its inception, nuclear strategy has been a profoundly ahistorical field. Only recently have scholars begun to exploit the wealth of evidentiary knowledge generated during the Cold War, whether that be in the form of diplomatic history or creating data sets against which to test rational choice models. Mining that data has revolutionary potential.
The energy and enthusiasm generated by President Obama’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons has cooled substantially, a change reflected at the latest Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, which ended with no final resolution or document. This latest failure feeds a generalized anxiety about the decline of the Nonproliferation Regime, a sense that an accumulation of small failures will lead to a tipping point after which the regime will no longer be able to play a role in generating the stable expectations that keep it politically meaningful.
POSSE member Mikhail Troitskiy took part in a debate with U.S.and European experts on the need for NATO to deploy additional tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in order to counter "Russia's nuclear brinksmanship." His commentary titled "Nuclear Escalation and the 'Russian World'" appeared, along with contributions by other authors, in the April-May 2015 issue ofSurvival.
Nuclear doctrines are critical for deterrence stability, they have long received enormous scholarly attention. Pakistan, however, presents a particularly challenging case in this regard. Given the ambiguity that shrouds Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, its study is a pressing task.
Over the last eight years, discussion about the UK's national interest have set the goal of building a "resiliant nation." To what degree has a shift from "security" to "resiliance" taken place? What is the criteria for a resiliant nuclear deterrent? How does this apply to the recent debate over Trident renewal?